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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
V. J. LUND, WILLARD E. KNIBBEE, 1 
ERNIE A. POULSEN and EVAN W. 
HANSEN, representing a Class of Persons 
residing and owning real property in Cot-
tonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah, l 
Plaintiff s-Appelktnts, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD MEADOWS COMPANY, a r 
partnership consisting of W. ALLEN PEL-
TON, and Others unknown, also SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision 
of the State of Utah, and PERSYL RICH- J 
ARDSON, Director of the Salt Lake Coun-
ty Building and Zoning Inspection Dept., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPOXDE~rr 
Case No. 
10015 
('( fl"l'() ~'rOOD ~lEADO\VS COMPANY 
~TATE~IENT OF NA1TURE OF CASE 
Respondent adopts n ppellants' Staten1ent of the N a-
ture of the ca~t'. 
Dl~POSITIOX OF LO\YER COl-:-RT 
Respondent adopts the appellants' statement of the 
Disposition in the Lower Court. 
HELlEF SOUGHT OX APPEAL 
Respondent is seeking affirmance of the judgment 
granted by the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County. rtah, awarding sum1nary judgn1ent in favor of 
DefPndants-Respondents. 
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STATE:J[EN'T OF ~fATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent finds the State1nent of :Material Facts 
in Appellants' Brief so incomplete that we set forth 
herein our own Statement of 1faterial Facts, arranged 
in the sequence to fit not only the chronological happen-
ings but the arguments of our own brief. 
Defendant-Respondent Cottonwood :Meadows Com-
pany, hereinafter referred to throughout this brief as 
"'Respondent", entered into an earnest n1oney agreement 
on Jan nary 12, 1962 to purchase certain lands herein-
after referred to as "Cottowood Meadows Estates." (R. 
35) Prior to the execution of the earnest money receipt 
on January 12, 1962, Respondent ascertained from the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission that the applic-
able zoning ordinances then in effect permitted construc-
tion of a mobile home park on said premises, which 
were then classified as Agricultural Zone A-2. (R. 36) 
On January 30, 1962 Evan W. Hansen, one of the plain-
tiffs herein, filed a written application to change the 
area from a classification of Agricultural Zone A-2 which 
permitted trailer courts, to Residential Zone S-1A, 
which did not permit same. (R. 106) One of the reasons 
for the request to amend the zoning from A-2 to S-lA 
was to stop a mobile home park from being built. (R.107) 
On February 8, 1962, Respondent completed the earnest 
money agreement by purchasing said Cottonwood Mea-
dows Estates and taking formal assignment of a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. (R. 36) As of July 1, 1963, Re-
spondent had actually paid for the purchase of said 
premises the sum of $44,491.41. (R. 26) On March 5 
Respondent engaged engineers to prepare plans and to 
do the required engineering work in order to make appli-
cation for a building permit. (R. 36-7) On March 27 
Respondent made application for a building permit for 
said mobile home trailer park (R. 37), and paid the 
building permit fee on April 3, 1962. On April10, 1962, 
the subdivision committee of the Planning Commission 
gave approval to the general lay-out for the mobile home 
park. (R. 105) The plans were approved by the Plan-
ning Commission on April 24, 1962, with the condition 
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that an alternate plan be submitted changing the mobile 
homr spn<·Ps, and the set-backs to conform to the zoning 
and mohilP home park ordinances. (R. 108) The staff 
of the Planning Commission was opposed to permitting 
a mobilP home park in the Cottonwood Meadows Estates 
(R. 108) but the Planning Commission was never reluct-
ant in planning the mobile home park and actually ap-
proved it on April 24, 1963. (R. 87 and R. 108) 
Pursuant to requirements of section 5-4-7 of the 
Nnlt Lake Count~· mobile home park ordinance Re-
spondent was required to, and did, dedicate a portion of 
its proywrty for street purposes as a condition to the 
issuance of the building permit. (R. 37) Salt Lake 
( 'ount~· on April 25, 1962, adopted an amendment to 
its zoning ordinances changing the classification of the 
nn'a herein involved from Agricultural Zone A-2 to Res-
idential Zone S-1A, which amendments became effective 
on Jfa~· 10, 1962. (R. 37 and R. 110-111) On June 12, 
1962, the Planning Director signed the plan for the mobile 
home park, dating it back to the tin1e when it was ap-
proved h~· the Planning Commission, April 10, 1962. 
On J nne 12, 1962, there was nothing of an administra-
tive nature remaining to be done by the Planning Com-
mission before issuance of the building permit. (R. 108) 
A letter was written by the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission to the County Attorney asking whether a 
building permit should be issued. (R. 87) Under date 
of June 8, 1962, four days before the Planning Director 
actually signed the plan for the mobile home park, the 
County Attorney by written inter-office memo to Doug 
Campbell, Planning Commission, answered this inquiry 
h~· stating "that the Planning Commission should sign 
and approve the plat and the building and zoning in-
spection department should issue the building permit." 
(Exhibit D-4) The County Attorney's inter-office memo 
recites that the above conclusion is based upon the fol-
lowing facts : 
"Application was made for the building per-
mit and fees tendered and the plat filed with your 
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offices. Changes in the engineering were neces-
sary requiring amended plats at various times, 
Pach one at the request of your office. In the 
interim, the Planning Commission approved the 
park subject to some further changes being made 
in the plat to the satisfaction of the subconunittee. 
Prior to this satisfaction, the zoning ordinances 
was changed prohibiting such parks in this area. 
''It would appear that all that remained to 
be done were basically ministerial acts, that all of 
the requirements of the ordinances had been met 
by the applicants except making requested 
changes in the plat. 'This would appear to be sim-
ilar to the interim between preliminary approval 
and final approval of a subdivision where the pre-
liminary approval is the key date subject to the 
Inaking of any required changes in the plat." 
(Exhibit D-4-) 
On Septen1ber 10, 1962, the building permit was is-
sued to Respondent for the mobile home park, which is 
now substantially built. (R. 28) But for the changes 
required by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
the building permit would have been issued prior to the 
purported zoning change. (R. 37) 
The area involved in this action is a more or less 
wooded area. (R. 99) No particular physical change 
occurred in the neighborhood in the year 1962. (R. 106) 
Nothing occurred up to August 29, 1963 to change the 
neighborhood from an agricultural classification to some-
thing else. (R. 107) 'The reason given by the applicants 
for the zoning change from A-2 to S-1A in January, 1962 
was that applicants wanted to stop a certain mobile park 
from coming in. ( R. 107) The Director of the Salt 
Lake County Zoning Department of the Planning Com-
Inission, Mr. Ralph McClure, testified that the applica-
tion for the zoning amendment filed on January 30, 1962, 
specifically referred to the fact that the subject area was 
originally classified agricultural because of the desire of 
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proJwrty 0\\'ll('l'~ to nmntain the area as agricultural to 
lw tt~Prl for farming and raising and grazing of farm 
animal~. ( R. 110) ~f r. ~IcClure further testified the 
an•a ~till rPmains substantially agricultural today. (R. 
110) 
\Yiwn Salt Lake County was considering the adop-
tion of thP ~eneral l\lobile Home Park Ordinance in 
~larch of 19(il, they also considered a recommendation 
mnd(' hv the staff that would have deleted mobile home 
park~ f.rom tlw permitted uses in an Agricultural Zone 
.\-~. llowPvPr, this was not adopted pursuant to that 
rf'commendation. (R. 111-112) The area was rezoned 
rffectivf' -:\fa~· 10, 1962 from Zone A-2 to S-1A. Some 
tinw mueh later than this Salt Lake County amended the 
pc>rmitted uses in an agricultural Zone A-2 by deleting 
t!H· right to have a trailer court therein. (R. 112) 
Plantiffs Lund, Knibbee, Poulsen and Hansen filed 
tlwir complaint as representatives of a class of persons 
re~iding and owning real property in Cottonwood 
HPights, ~nlt Lake County. (R. 1) Plaintiff-Appellant 
Hansen had personal knowledge that a building permit 
had brf'n issued to Respondent for the construction of 
a mobilP h01ne park, and said Hansen acquired this 
knowledge at about the time of the issuance of the permit, 
which was issued on September 10, 19·62. (R. 137) 
On January 11, 1963, Respondent made an offer to 
purchase the Bayou Country Club property, which offer 
was accepted by the Receiver in Civil Case No. 136319, 
Third Judicial District, on or about the 20th of J anu-
ary. 1963, and confirmed by the Court on February 6, 
ti, 1963. (R. 39) The Bayou Country Club property is 
contiguous to the Cottonwood J\1:eadows Estates and 
contains club house facilities, and a swimming pool; 
Dt•fendant purchased this property for a total purchase 
price of $112,500.00 for use in connection with the pro-
posed mobile home park in order to enhance its attrac-
tiveness for business purposes. (R. 38) Respondent 
would not have made this purchase except for the con-
templated utility to the mobile home park. (R. 39) 
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rl1his pending lawsuit was comn1enced by plaintiffs 
on February 21, 1963. (R. 39) 
Salt Lake County and Persyl Richardson, Director 
of the Salt Lake County Building and Zoning Inspection 
Departments, Defendants and Respondents herein, by 
their answer filed in the lower court on June 26, 1963, 
assert that the building permit was legally and properly 
issued to Respondent Cottonwood Meadows Company on 
September 10, 1962, which permit has never been revoked 
or cancelled. (R. 33) 
In addition to the "Unifonn Zoning Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County" (Exhibit D-3) which are quoted from 
in Appellants' "Statement of Material Facts," Respond-
ent calls attention to the Mobile Home Park Ordinance 
of Salt Lake County (Exhibit D-1) adopted on Septem-
ber 6, 1961. This ordinance provides in part as follows: 
"5-4-2: DEFINITIONS. 
* * * 
"(b) 'Mobile home' means any vehicle or 
similar portable structure having been construct-
ed with wheels (whether or not such wheels have 
been removed) and having no foundation other 
than wheels, jacks or skirtings and so designed 
or constructed as to permit occupancy for dwell-
ing or sleeping purposes. 
" (c) 'Mobile home park' means any plot of 
ground upon which two or more mobile homes, 
occupied for dwelling or sleeping purposes, are 
located, regardless of whether or not a charge 
is made for such accommodation. 
* * * 
"5-4-3: LICENSE; TE1fPORARY PER-
MIT. 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to 
maintain or operate a mobile home park within 
the limits of Salt Lake County, Utah, unless such 
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person ~hall first obtain a license, and permit, ex-
cept that: 
• • • 
":l--l-5: APPLICANT FOR PERMIT 
(a) Before an application for a Mobile 
Home Park permit can be filed, plans and speci-
fication therefor shall be submitted to the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission for its inves-
tigation and approval. (Four ( 4) B & W prints 
of tlH• proposed park shall be filed on paper not 
smaller than 17 x 22 inches and shall include the 
following: 
( 1) The name and address of the applicant. 
(2) The location and legal description of 
the :Mobile Home Park. 
(3) Finish contour lines at one foot inter-
vals. 
( -l) Location of all existing public streets 
within two hundred (200) feet of the proposed 
park. 
(5) The number, size, location, and type of 
all Mobile Home spaces. 
( 6) The location, size, and specifications for 
construction of roadways and walkways. 
(7) Plans and specifications of all build-
ings, improvements, and facilities to be construct-
ed within the Mobile Home Park. 
(8) The location and size of all public utility 
lines within the Mobile Home Park. 
(9) Such further information as required by 
this Ordinance or that may be required by the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission to enable 
it to determine if the proposed park will comply 
with legal requirements. 
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* * * 
""5-4-6: LOCATION 
"Location of mobile home parks shall be 
regulated by the Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake 
County. Where any boundary of a park directly 
abuts property which is improved with a per-
manent residential building or directly abuts un-
improved property which may under existing laws 
and regulations be used for permanent residen-
tial construction, a six ( 6) foot high fence, wall, 
or hedge properly related to surrounding topog-
raphy and the character of the surrounding de-
velopment shall be provided along such boundary. 
"5-4-7: STREET DEDICATION 
"The developer of the mobile home park shall 
be required to dedicate and improve to county 
standards all streets within the proposed mobile 
home park that are determined by the County 
Planning Commission necessary to provide ade-
quate neighborhood circulation. 
* * * 
"5-4-9: MINIMUM: J\1:0BILE HOME 
PARK AREA 
"The minimum area for any :Mobile Home 
Park shall be five ( 5) acres. 
"5-4-10: MOBILE HOME PARK PLAN 
"The mobile home park shall conform to the 
following requirements: 
" (a) The park shall be located on a well-
drained site, properly graded to insure rapid 
drainage and free from stagnant pools of water. 
"(b) Each park shall provide mobile home 
spaces, and each such space shall be clearly de-
fined or delineated. Each space shall have an 
area of not less than 3,000 square feet exclusive 
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of ~t n·Pt~ and sidewalks and a width of not less 
than -lO f'PPt. 
'" (e) l\fohile hmnes shall he so located on 
Pach space so that there shall be at least a 15 foot 
<'lParan<'e between rnobile homes, provided, how-
PVPr, that with respect to mobile homes parked 
end-to-end, the end-to-end clearance may be less 
than 1;) feet but shall be not less than 10 feet. 
~ o rnobile home shall be located closer than 15 
feet to an~· building within the park or to any .Jl.-
pro1wrty line of the park which d<f,5 not abut 
upon a public street or highway. No mobile home 
~hall be located closer to any property line of 
the park abutting upon a public street or highway 
than 25 feet or such other distance as may be 
established by ordinance or regulation as front 
yard set-back requirement with respect to conven-
tional buildings in the zoning district in which 
the mobile home park is located. 
" (d) All mobile home spaces shall abut upon 
a driveway street. Driveway streets within the 
rnobile home park shall be continuous wherever 
reasonably possible; where it is necessary to pro-
vide a driveway street that is not continuous 
adequate paved vehicular turning space shall be 
provided at the closed end thereof. 
" (e) Walkways constructed of asphalt or 
concrete not less than two feet wide shall be pro-
vided from the mobile home spaces to the service 
buildings. 
" (f) All driveway streets and walkways 
within the park shall be hard surfaced and 
lighted from sunset to sunrise w·ith lamps of not 
less than 100 watts each, spaced at intervals of 
not more than 100 feet. 
"(g) Each park shall provide service build-
ings to house such toilet, bathing and other sani-
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tation facilities as are hereinafter more parti{'u-
larly prescribed. 
"(h) An electrical outlet supplying at least 
100-115 volts, 50 amperes shall be provided for 
each mobile home space. 
"(i) Sufficient parking space shall be pro-
vided for the parking of at least one motor ve-
hicle upon each mobile home space. 
"(j) Mobile home pads shall be not less than 
10 ft. by 40 ft. and constructed of concrete at 
least four ( 4") inches thick." 
"5-4-11: WATER SUPPLY" 
(Pure drinking water and adequate hot water 
must be available at all times.) 
"5-4-12: S-ANITATION F ACILITIE8" 
('Toilets, urinals, showers, or tub baths must 
be available.) 
"5-4-13: SERVICE BUILDINGS" 
(Well lighted, screened, and ventilated serv-
ice buildings to house sanitation facilities must 
be provided.) 
"5-4-14: SEWAGE AND REFUGE DIS-
POSAL" 
(Waste from showers, tubs, toilets, urinals, 
lavatories and slop sinks must be discharged into 
public sewer system.) 
"5-4-15: GARBAGE RECEPT'A:CLES" 
(Sanitary garbage cans must be available in 
adequate numbers to permit disposal of all gar-
bage and rubbish ,and must be collected at least 
twice a week.) 
"5-4-16: INSECT AND RODENT CON-
TROL" 
(All harborage places for rodents, etc., shall 
be eliminated or effectively treated.) 
10 
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"5-~-17: FIRE PROTECTION" 
(..:\dPquate fire extinguishing equipment, 
proper]~· located to assure proper fire protection 
1nust be available at all times.) 
.. 5-~-18: SUPERVISION" 
(A duly authorized attendant or caretaker 
shall be in charge at all times to assure clean 
orderly and sanitary condition.) 
• • • 
"5--!-20: BUILDING INSPECTOR TO 
ENFORCE 
• • • 
"That all ordinances or parts or ordinances 
in conflict herewith are repealed. 
. . ., 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
FI~DING THA1T APPELLANTS FAILED 
TO EXHAlT8T THEIR ADl\fiNIS:TRATIVE 
R Ij~~ll~DY. 
Respondent has quoted at length from the Mobile 
Home Park Ordinance so that this Court will have a true 
perspective of the nature of the trailer court here in-
volved. Obviously it is not a "sheepherders camp" or a 
"cattle camp" as suggested by appellants in their brief. 
The building permit authorizing the construction of a 
mobile home park on the subject lands was formally 
issued to the Respondents on September 10, 1962. No 
appeal of any kind was ever filed by any of the appellants 
requesting a review of the issuance of the building per-
mit. This lawsuit was commenced by the plaintiffs on 
February 21, 1963. Appellants in their agrument under 
Point I of their brief lay great stress on certain per-
missive language appearing in Section 17-27-16, Utah 
Code ~-\nnotated, 1953. They have italicized the language 
showing that an appeal to the Board of Adjustment 
11 
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"may be taken" by any person aggrieved * * * b)' a 
decision of an~r administrative officer * * * made in the 
course of the administration or enforcement of the pro-
visions of the zoning resolution. The key language in 
this section of the Code which is mandatory \\'as com-
pletely overlooked by appellants. The sentence of Sec-
tion 17-:27-16 overlooked by appellants provides 
"the time within which such appeal must be made 
and the form or other procedure relating thereto 
shall be as specified in the general rules provided 
in writing by the Board of County Commis-
sioners." 
The Board of County Commissioners have adopted a 
regulation which is in evidence in this case which again, 
using mandatory language, provides that an appeal to the 
Board of Adjustment must be taken within ninety days 
after the cause arises. 
Thus, the real crucial question before this Court 
is whether the Appellants are persons aggrieved by a 
decision of an administrative officer made in the course 
of the administration of the zoning resolution. There 
can be no doubt that the issuance of a building permit 
involves a decision by an administrative officer in the 
course of the administration of the zoning resolution. 
Appellants argue that they are not "persons aggrieved." 
Appellants quote from Webster's International Diction-
ary, which defines "aggrieved" as follows: "adversely 
affected in respect of legal rights; suffering from an 
infringement or denial of legal rights." They then take 
the position that they are not aggrieved by any action 
because the action was not taken directly against them. 
However, the whole gist of Appellant's lawsuit is that 
they have been injured and adversely affected in respect 
of their legal rights by the issuance of the building per-
mit. Why else are Appellants involved in this lawsuit 
except the fact that they believe they have been adversly 
affected hy the issuance of the building permit. From 
12 
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tlwir ~tandpoint, to arg·n<' that tlu·y are not adversely 
aff•·<·tt·d i~ to approach the ridi('nlous. 
, \ ppPllnnb had timPly knowh,dge of the fact that a 
hnilding twrmit had be<'n issued as Appellant Hansen, 
who l'Ppres(:'nts a class of persons residing and owning 
rPal proJwrt:v in Salt Lake County, personally knew about 
thr i~~u:uwP of the building permit around September 
10, 19(i~. 
f n ('On~idering the doctrine Of exhaustion Of admin-
j~tratiVP rPmedies, courts almost invariably make a dis-
tinction lwtwePn a situation where the Appellant chal-
lPn~P~ in it~ entirdy the validity of a zoning ordinance 
~md a situation when' the Appellant is simply challenging 
tht• propriet~· of administrative action taken by adminis-
ti·ntive personnel and in which the ordinance itself is 
not undPr attack. Most courts say that if the challenges 
are to the entire ordinance there may not be the same 
ha~ic rea~ons for requiring exhaustion of administrative 
rPnwdies ,,·here the appeals body who would hear and 
make the admini~trative review would simply be review-
ing their own adoption of the ordinance. However, it 
~t't'lllS that almost without exception where the challenge 
in thP eourts is n1ade, not upon the validity of the ordi-
nance, hut upon administrative action such as the issu-
anrP of a building permit, that the applicant must exhaust 
hi~ administrative remedies as provided and authorized 
hy law before a court will grant relief. That is precisely 
tlw ~ituation before this Court in the subject case. ·The 
challenge is entirely one related to administrative action 
takrn by administrative personnel of the county. The 
entirr n:>ason for the rule requiring the exhaustion of 
administratin· re1nedies is thus applicable to the facts 
of this case. 
The n1andatory language of the Utah statute which 
requin·~ that the appeal m'ltst be taken pursuant to the 
time deadline set forth in the regulation adopted by the 
County recognizes and, in fact, puts Utah in that group 
of statrs which has actually codified the rule that the 
13 
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adrninistrative remedv must be exhausted before resort 
rnay be taken to the ~ourts. 
In the face of the mandatory language jn Section 
17-27-16, U.C.A., 1953, and the mandatory language of 
the County ordinance requiring the exhaustion of the 
administrative remedy, the construction which Appel-
lants have placed upon Sectjon 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, 
would, in effect, nullify the provisions of Section 16, 
and the ordinance adopted thereunder. ·To adopt the 
construction requested by Appellants in their brief would 
1nean that the court would have to ignore completely 
the mandatory provisions of Section 16. It is a funda-
mental rule of statutory construction that whenever 
possible, construction be placed upon each section of a 
statute which would make each section operative. This 
can be done by simply construing Section 16 as being 
mandatory and Section 23 as being declarative of the 
common law right to take the matter to court after 
exhaustion of the statutory administrative remedy. Provo 
City v. Claudin, 63 P. 2d 570. Any other construction of 
Sections 16 and 23 would result in a conflict between the 
two sections of the same law. 
Under Appellants' theory with respect to Section 
17-27-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, appellants would 
have their election whether to take an administrative 
appeal or whether to commence an independent action 
in the courts. If they_ made their election to forego the 
administrative appeal, under their theory they would 
be entitled to file their suit in the District Court under 
Section 23 at any time within the applicable general 
statute of limitations. This could mean that the holder 
of a building permit from the county would not be in 
a position to commence construction with complete 
safety until the statute of limitations had run. Let us 
take the facts of this case for purposes of illustration. 
If Appellants are correct, they would have until the 
exhaustion of the general statute of limitations before 
thev would necessarily have needed to commence the 
pre~sent suit to revoke the building permit which wa~ 
14 
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i~slwd on HPptetnber 10, 1 !Hi:2. By the very terms of 
the building pertnits i~~uPd by Salt Lake County, they 
.. xpire thenw~dve~ if construction is not commenced with-
in otH' vear from the date of issuance. A nervous builder 
might iuwt> to <·hoose between con1mencing construction 
ht>t'on• t IH• perrnit expires or awaiting the tolling of 
thP general statut<> of limitations, at which tilne, not 
having a valid permit in effect, he would have to re-
apply for onP and start all over on the same merry-go-
round. Thi~ constn1ction of section 23 would make it 
impossihh· for building and construction enterpreneurs 
to proePed- without the risk of a court case upset-
ting their plans after having made heavy investments. 
l f we assume, on the other hand, that Respondent's 
po::; i tion is correct, then anyone desiring to contest the 
i::;suance of a building permit would have to do so within 
nim•ty days. If no contest is filed within the ninety days, 
then the entrepreneur could proceed with full safety 
that no remedy would be available at a later date to 
upset his expenditure of funds in the construction of 
the enterprise. In order to make the zoning and build-
ing- laws workable from the standpoint of the public at 
largP, we submit that the only construction which can 
work with fairness to all concerned is to require any 
aggrieved parties to exhaust their administrative reme-
(li(•::; as provided in the ordinance, to-wit: within ninety 
days, rather than allowing them the full time permitted 
hy the general statute of limitations within which to com-
mence an original action in court. 
For a case that gives an exhaustive discussion of 
the whole theory back of the rule that one must exhaust 
one's administrative remedies before resorting to the 
courts, see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeals, 109 
P. 2d 9-1:2. In this case there is a complete review of 
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
including the conclusion of the court that relief must 
be sought from the administrative body and this remedy 
exhausted before the courts will act where an adminis-
trative remedy is provided by statute. In fact, the court 
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held that no one is entitled to judicial relief for an im-
posed or threatened injury until the prescribed admini~­
trative remedy has been exhausted. 
For a Utah case in which the litigants exhausted 
their administrative remedy and then appealed to the 
courts, see Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Company, 
92 P. 2d 724. This case involved a supposed violation 
of zoning ordinances. It was unnecessary to discuss 
the doctrine of administrative remedies in this case 
sirnply because Walton followed the prescribed statu-
tory administrative steps and then appealed to the 
courts, where he was successful in reversing the ad-
verse ad1ninistrative rulings. 
To the same effect, see Cliff v. Bilett, 241 P. 2d 
437, decided in 1952 by the Colorado Supreme Court; 
Metcalf v. Los Angeles County, 148 P. 2d 645. 
Appellants in their research found one case so com-
pletely identical to the ordinances, statutes and the 
general factual situation present in this case that we 
feel compelled to set forth the case in some detail. We 
refer to ~Rosenthal v. City of Dallas, 211 S.W. 2d, 279. 
In this case the state statute provided: 
"Appeals to the Board of Adjustment may 
be taken by any person aggrieved or by any 
officer department, board or bureau of the mu-
nicipality affected by any decision of the ad-
ministrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken 
·within a reasonable time as provided by the rules 
of the Board by filing with the officer from 
whom the appeal is taken and with the board." 
Anoth0r section of the same statute provided: 
"In case any building or structure is erected, 
reconstructed, altered, repaired, converted or 
1naintained or any building, structure or land is 
used in violation of this act, or of any ordinance 
16 
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or otlwr n·.~ulation 1nade under authority con-
t'PtTed IH·r .. hy, tJw proper local authorities of 
the muni<·ipalit:· in addition to other remedies 
may in:-;titut<> any appropriate action or pro-
<'PPdinp;:-; to prevent such unlawful erection, con-
:-:t ruction, Pte." 
This ea:-;p wa:-; brought by the City of Dallas charg-
ing- the dPI\•ndant with violation of zoning ordinances 
und maintaining a public and private nuisance. A 
building JWrmit had been issued by the proper admin-
i~trativP offiePr. Subsequent thereto notices were sent 
to the HPspondent advising him to stop work on the 
projPet because thP permit was issued in error. This 
notice to quit, hmn•v<>r, was many months after the 
original issuance of the permit and after start of actual 
construction was wPll under way. The court at page 
:2!l:) said: 
"In tlw instant case the permit issued to 
appellant for operation of a cold storage plant 
including Hwat curing, was based on a specific 
finding of the evidence of a nonconforming use 
h:· the building inspector who is charged with 
thP duty of enforcing this ordinance, from which 
no appeal was prosecuted by either city officials 
or interested iHdividuals. In my opinion the ac-
tion of the building inspector became in a sense 
res judicata." 
Tlw opinion continues by quoting from a Texas 
Law RPviPw article by Professor Davis as follows: 
'"To smne extent this theory of direct and 
collateral attack has been carried over into ad-
Ininistrative la\\·. The theory is that a party who 
fails to make a direct attack on an administra-
tive order is barred by res judicata from making 
a collateral attack except when the order is void 
on account of such a reason as fraud, lack of 
jurisdiction, or denial of a fair hearing." 
17 
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The decision continues by further quoting from 
Bassett on Zoning at page 106, as follows: 
"Where a building department, through an 
employee, has issued a permit for a noncon-
forming building and construction has proceeded 
and no appeal to the Board of Appeals has been 
taken by neighbors, a permit will not be revoked." 
In summary, the Texas appellate court held that 
in the face of no appeal having been taken by the city 
from the original issuance of the permit, that the per-
nlit holder acquired a vested property right in the 
permit and that the attempted revocation, even though 
by the city itself, was arbitrary and unreasonable. The 
City of Dallas was estopped from any further action 
to enjoin the building project despite the statutory 
language which provided that in addition to other 
'remedies the city might institute appropriate action or 
proceedings to prevent unlawful erection, construction, 
etc. (It is interesting to note that what was originally 
shown as the dissenting opinion of Justice Looney, from 
which these quotes have been made, by virtue of the 
Chief Justice changing his opinion, apparently on re-
hearing, actually became the prevailing opinion of the 
court. See the last sentence of the concurring opinion 
of the Chief Justice.) 
Had an administrative appeal been taken by the 
Appellants as provided by state statute and by Salt 
Lake County ordinance, a complete record could have 
been 1nade with respect to all of the administrative de-
tail which preceded the issuance of the building permit. 
For example, there is evidence in this abbreviated record 
that the subordinate administrative staff of the Salt 
Lake County Planning and Zoning offices were opposed 
to the granting of a building permit for the erection 
of the mobile home park. There is also evidence in 
the record that the Salt Lake County Planning Com-
rnission was never reluctant in planning the mobile home 
park and actually approved it, as reflected in their April 
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rninntP~. It is ent irPiy po~~ible that despite the policy 
dt>('i~ion of the ( 10nunission the subordinate administra-
tive personnel being opposed to that policy decision 
mav havP ~lowPd down the administrative actions and 
al't;mlly rPtarded the final issuance of the building per-
mit. This is the type of matter that should have been 
straightened out h~' a timely appeal at the administra-
tin' IPYPl so that a complete record could have been 
marlP of tho~<' actions and decisions while it was still 
at tlw administrative level. 
In the area of planning and zoning the County is 
adually functioning in a quasi legislative area and when 
it has eompleted its function, including the review of its 
own actions, its decision becomes "the law of the case," 
unless it is modified or overruled by appropriate appeal 
therefrom. In the absence of appeal from an administra-
tin' decision it becomes final and is the "law of the case" 
forever, to be applied in any subsequent dispute involving 
that same issue. 
In the case of Provo City v. Claudin, decided by the 
Ptah Supreme Court in 1936 and reported at 63 P. 2d 
:170, some most interesting comments are made with 
respect to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. ~[r. Claudin made an application to estab-
lish a funeral home upon certain described prmnises. It 
appears frmn allegations recited that a permit to re-
model a hmne was issued but that the application for 
permission to construct a funeral parlor was denied. 
~lr. Claudin took the matter before the Board of Ad-
justment, the appeals body, who made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, etc., and denied the right of 
the Claudins to convert this property into a funeral 
home. The statutes provided that a person aggrieved 
hy a decision of the Board of Adjustment could main-
tain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court 
of competent jurisdiction. Despite this provision, no 
appeal was taken from the decision of the Board of 
&-\djustment, but instead Claudin remodeled the home 
for use as a funeral parlor. Provo City brought this 
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action to enJOin Claudin frmn using the home as a 
funeral parlor. As a defense to the injunction ~nit 
Claudin hit the city with the plea of an unfair ordi-
nance. The Utah Supreme Court held that the trial 
court need not consider such matters in issue until they 
have bePn tried ad1ninistratively. K ot having appealed 
the decision of the Board of Adjustment, Claudin had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and had no 
standing in court to challenge the fairness of the ordi-
nance. 
Section 17-27-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in 
describing the functions of the Board of Adjustment 
at the county level provides that persons aggrieved have 
a permissive right of appeal. Upon appeals the Board of 
Adjushnent has, among others, the power to authorize a 
variance under certain specified conditions. This is the 
same power referred to in the Claudin case where owners 
might suffer special hardships by the ordinance. The 
variance may be granted to make the ordinance pliable 
enough so as not to militate against the public welfare. 
Had Appellants exhausted their administrative remedy 
by appealing to the Board of Adjustment, it is entirely 
possible that the Board might have considered a vari-
ance in favor of Respondent even though they might 
have first determined that the building permit should 
not have issued. The Appellants, therefore, by ignoring 
the requirement that they exhaust their administrative 
rmnedy have effectively precluded the Board of Ad-
justment from even considering the necessity or wisdom 
of granting a variance to the defendants. This is but 
one more reason why appellants must be required to 
exhaust their administrative remedy before taking the 
n1atter to the courts. This is particularly true where 
the County itself, by its pleadings in this case, is even 
now asserting that the permit was properly issued, and 
never having been revoked, is valid today. Under this 
state of the record, laches, estoppel and failure to ex-
haust thP ·available ad1ninistrative remedies all stare 
Appellants squarely in the face. 
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POlXrr II 
J•:STOPPI1~L, LACH:B~S, OR FAILURE TO 
I·:XIL\rST ;\D~lli\ISTRATI\TE REMEDIES 
~1.\ Y .TrSTIFY REFFSAL TO REYOKE A 
PJ•:H~ll'l, EVI•~N TH01TOH IT WAS ORIGI-
~.\LLY ISSUED IN YlOLATION OF A 
IIASTlLY ADOPTED ZOXING A~fE·ND­
~II•:XT . 
. \ ppPllants assert that a building permit which is 
i~~ned in violation of the existing zoning ordinance is 
null and void and that no vested rights could be ac-
quired thereundPr even though the permit holder acted 
in rPlianeP on said permit. Circumstances may be pres-
ent in any given ease to justify the court's applying 
the doctrines of estoppel, laches or failure to exhaust 
admini~tratin' remedies in support of a building per-
mit issued in violation of a hastily adopted zoning 
anwndment. Under proper circumstances the invoca-
tion of any of these defenses may prevent the granting 
of relief to an adjoining landowner who is protesting 
<·on~truction pursuant to such a building permit. Re-
~pondents in this case are not clairning estoppel against 
::-;alt Lake County and have no need to make such a 
rlaim because Salt Lake County is, even today, assert-
ing the validity of the issuance of the building permit. 
The estoppel which Respondents claim is an estoppel 
again~t Plaintiff-Appellants who stood by with knowl-
~'dgt> of the issuance of the pennit without challenging 
it through administrative channels, as authorized by 
law and ordinance. 
Illinois courts have specifically recognized that even 
the City may be estopped to deny the validity of a 
permit where the pennit was issued under authority 
of the legis/afire body of the municipality. See People 
c.r rel Deddo v. Thompson, 209 Ill. App. 570, and Hurt 
r. Hejhal, :259 Ill. App. 221. 
In the Deddo r. Thompson case it appears that 
the City Council passed an order directing the Com-
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missioner of Buildings to issue a permit for tlw con-
struction of a garage near a hospital and school 
despite the existence of an ordinance which made it 
unlawful to build or maintain a garage within a speci-
fied distance from a hospital or school. The court 
held that the council could not amend an ordinance 
by simply issuing such an order but when the individual 
to whom the building order was issued, in reliance 
upon such a permit, proceeded and constructed a garage 
at large expense and without objection by the school 
and hospital authorities and all interested parties, the 
City ·would be estopped to refuse to issue a license for 
the conduct of the garage and mandamus would lie to 
compel its issuance. 
Similarly, in the Hurt v. Hejhal case, the City was 
held estopped to enjoin the erection of a building as 
in violation of a zoning ordinance where the owner 
obtained a building permit and the City Council affirm-
atively authorized him to proceed with the work after 
it had been temporarily suspended by the City upon 
the complaint of adjoining property owners, and in 
reliance upon this act the owner expended a large sum 
of money. 
The situation is almost identical in the case before 
this Court. The building permit was issued by the subor-
dinate administrative personnel of Salt Lake County, the 
neighboring land owners slept on their rights and did not 
exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing the 
issuance of the permit and when this lawsuit was filed 
by the neighboring property owners Salt Lake County, 
the quaisi sovereign body, filed its answer asserting that 
the permit was validly and properly issued and that it 
has never been revoked. Salt Lake County even required 
Respondent to dedicate a portion of its property f'or 
street purposes as a condition to the issuance of the 
bu.ilding permit. In relianee upon all of these facts 
and the possibility of the permit lapsing for non-use, 
Respondent commenced heavy construction immediately 
after slnnmary judgment was entered in the trial court 
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and havP now substantially eomplrtPd a major portion 
ol' tlw mobile hmne park. This has been done with the 
ohvion~ approval of ~alt Lake County as witnessed by 
thPir plPading- and activities in this appeal. 
Some courts have held that the zoning law in effect 
at the time that the permit application was made should 
control. The case that best states this position is State 
, .. JJ'oodmansee, 72 N. E. 2d 789 (Ohio 1946). In this 
case the petitioner applied for a permit for a poultry 
store, which business was allowed under the zoning law 
then in effect. The permit was withheld while the zon-
ing law was amended. The court held that the amendment 
would not affect property owners' rights with respect to 
an application for a permit filed before the ordinance was 
amended where the proposed use of the building would 
not violate the ordinances at the time the request for 
the permit was made. Other cases supporting this view 
include State v. Village of Wickliffe, 80 N.E. 2d 200; Vin.e 
1'. Zabriskie, 3 Atl. 2d 886 (N. J. 1936) ; Dubow v. Ross, 
1731\tlisc. 219,22 N.Y. S. 2d 610 (New York 1938); Hardy 
r. Superior Court, 284 Pac. 93 (Wash.1930). 
The case of Munrns v. Stenma;n, 314 P. 2d 67 (Calif. 
1957) generally holds that a municipal council cannot, by 
the enactment of an emergency amendment to a zoning 
ordinance, or by ministerial delay, deprive a property 
owner of his right to a permit in accordance with the 
ordinance in effect at the time of his application for the 
permit. To the same general effect see State v. City of 
Bellriew, 275 P. 2d 899 (Wash.1954), which case held that 
the law in effect, when the only items left undone are 
purely ministerial, should control. 
This court in Parrish v. Richards, 336 P. 2d 122, an-
nounced the doctrine that "in the construction of uncer-
tain or ambiguous restrictions as to the use of property, 
the courts shall resolve all doubts in favor of the free and 
unrestricted use of the property.'' We submit that if the 
court believes there is any uncertainty surrounding the 
effect of amendment of the zoning ordinance or surround-
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ing the Utah statute and Salt Lake County ordinances 
with respect to the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies then this court should apply the doctrine 
announced in Pa.rrish v. Richards. 
Appellants themselves recognize the rule of law at 
page 14 of their brief "that if before the ordinance is 
amended a party substantially changes his position in 
reliance on the ordinance or if only ministerial acts 
are left to be performed before a permit is issued, the 
permit may, nevertheless, issue despite the adoption 
of the amendment." Appellants argue that since we 
knew that someone else was trying to get the ordinance 
changed that we were on notice during this interval 
of time. Respondents assert that not every effort to 
mnend the zoning ordinances is successful and that not 
every effort to change them requires those holding 
building permits or those acquiring property to await 
the outcome of the efforts or to assume that in all 
cases the proposed changes will be enacted. Appellants 
also assert at page 15 of their brief that since there 
was an application to amend the ordinance staring the 
"Board" in the face which they must rule on prior to 
issuing a building permit, that you could hardly say 
that there was a ministerial act to be performed. We 
know of no rule of law which requires the County 
Board to act on an application to amend the ordinance 
just because an applieation is filed. The legislatiYe body, 
to-wit: the County Commission, might simply table 
such an application. 
POIN"T III 
TIIE A~fENDING ORDINAKCE GHAXGIXO 
THE SFB.JECT LANDR TO RESIDENTIAL 
ZONE S1-A \YAS AN ILLEGAL SPOT ZON-
I~G PROVISION. 
Prior to 1962 the subject lands were classified as 
agricultural Zone A -2. Under this elassification the 
following is a partial list of permitted uses; grain stor-
age elevators, farms, liYestock raising and grazing, 
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l'rnit and Yt>getahlP :-;torage and packing plants, fruit 
and VPg"Ptahle :-;tands, fur farms, dairy or creamery, 
kemwl:-;, public :-;tahlPs, riding academies, mortuaries, 
<'t>IIIPtariL•:-i, hay chopping, hospitals, sanitariums, air-
port:-;, <·i I'<' \IS or transient amusernents, dude ranches, 
golf driving ranges, gun clubs, trailer camps, mines, 
quarri<':-i and g-ntYPl pits. (Exhibit D-3, page -t-8.) 
X one of the foregoing uses are permitted in an 
area <"la:-;:-;ifiPd a:-; Residential zone Sl-A. 
On January 30, 1962 Evan W. I-Iansen, one of the 
.\ppellants herein, filed a written application to change 
tlw an•a from a classification of Agricultural Zone A-2 
which permitted trailer courts, to Residental Zone S1-A, 
wh i<'h did not permit trailer courts. The reason for 
thP rPqUPHt to amend the zoning was to stop a mobile 
home park from being built. (R. 106-7) 
The record shows that this area is more or less 
wooded: that no particular physical change occurred 
in tlw area in 1962; that nothing had occurred to change 
the 1/('i.rthl)()rlwod from an agricultural classification. 
The Director of the Salt Lake County Zoning Depart-
uwnt of thP Planning Commission testified that the 
area \\·as originally classified agricultural because of 
the dPsire of the property owners to maintain the area 
for farming and raising and grazing of farm animals. 
II P further testified that the "area still remains sub-
~tantially agricultural today." 
Despitt> these uncontroverted facts the area was 
rPzoned Residential S1-A as of May 10, 19'62. This 
''"n~. therefore, an illegal spot zoning ordinance. 
~-\~ this Court so aptly put it, "Spot Zoning" cases 
are "'generally cases where a particular small tract 
within a large district was specially zoned so as to 
impose upou it restrictions not in1posed upon the sur-
rounding lands, • • • not done in pursuance of any gen-
Pral or comprehensive plan." Marshall v. Salt Lake 
City, 141 P. 2d 70-l at 711. Generally, where a parcel 
of land is classified differently from all the surrounding 
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area for no apparent reason or purpose except to favor 
the applicant for the zoning change, it is referred to 
as spot zoning, and is invalid because it is discrimina-
tory. That is the situation in this case as shown by 
the record. 
'The Third Circuit in Wilcox v. Pittsburgh, 121 F. 
2d 835, held that a complaint which alleged that an 
amended zoning ordinance selected one block out of a 
larger area; that the amendment to the zoning ordi-
nance had an instigator; and finally that there had been 
no change in conditions between passage of the original 
ordinance and the amendments, stated a good cause 
of action. The opinion points out that courts have not 
been unworldly enough to ignore the effect of an anxious 
client and persistent counsel on the minds of council- ~ 
men. If in addition, there has been no ch~ge of the 
neighborhood character, then amendment is unjustified. 
As conditions are of necessity the basis and justification 
for zoning, clearly a change in the former is essential 
to a change in the latter. 
Obviously, Plaintiff-Appellant Hansen and those 
who also signed the petition to amend the zoning ordi-
nance in this case were the instigators. We even have 
their self confessed motive. They didn't want a mobile 
hmne park to be built near their homes. But is this 
enough to justify an mnendment changing the area from 
one classification to another? \Ye submit that it is not. 
Salt Lake County, if it did not want to permit 
1nobile home parks in this area which was obviously 
classified properly as an agricultural zone, should have 
merely amended the permitted uses in that zone by 
deleting mobile home parks therefrom, instead of im-
properly reclassifying the zone. 
POINT IY 
THE MINIMUM LOT AREA FOR EACH 
AND EVERY ::t\IOBILE HO~IE IS NOT RE-
STRICTED TO ONE F1'LL ACRE. 
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Salt LakP County adopted the ~lobile Home Park 
Ordinan('P on HPph•mlw r 6, 1961. This ordinance spe-
t·i t'il'ally provided in Section :20 "that all ordinances or 
parts of ordinances in conflict hereof are repealed." 
This ordinancP also definPs a rnobile home "as any 
Vl'hielP or similar portable structure having been con-
~t rneh•d with wheels whether or not they have been 
rpmovt'd and having no foundation other than wheels, 
jack~ or skirtings and so designed or constructed so 
us to pt-rmit oeeupancy for dwelling or sleeping pur-
po~Ps.'' A mobile home park is defined "as any plot 
nf ground on which two or more rnobile homes occu-
pied for dwelling or sleeping purposes are located re-
gard!<'~~ of whether or not a charge is made for such 
accommodation." Upon the adoption of this 1961 ordi-
nance there can be no question that "trailer camps" 
or any other for1n of n1obile home previously referred 
to hy ordinances in Salt Lake County was now to be 
controlled by the new Mobile Home Park provision. 
Appellants sarcastically argue at page 17 of their brief 
that "trailer camps" in an agricultural area such as 
ZonP A-:2 would contemplate the sarne being sheepherd-
Pr's can1ps or cattle camps. Such an assumption, of 
course, completely ignors the fact that the Mobile Home 
Park Ordinance had been adopted in 1961 and further 
ignores the fact that all ordinances and parts of ordi-
nances in conflict therewith have been repealed. Ap-
pellants also argue in this section of their brief that 
the residential home owners had great and important 
inYPstnHJnts in their homes and, by inference at least, 
indicate that this should have controlled the decision 
of the trial court. Zoning laws by their very nature 
always restrict the use of someone's property in a 
manner which may create unhappiness on at least part 
of those within the zoning district. It is invariably true 
that one living on one side of the boundary of the zon-
ing district will be precluded from doing something 
which the neighbor across the artificial line can do. 
Zoning ordinances, therefore, are in all cases a restric-
tion on the free and untrammelled right of property 
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o\\~nPrs to use their property as the~· 1nay individually 
desire. Nevertheless, Salt Lake County adopted its gene-
ral zoning ordinances (Exh. D-3), which were effective 
on June 15, 1957, and which specifically authorized trailer 
camps in Agricultural Zone A-2. In this general ordi-
nance an automobile trailer is defined as "a vehicle with 
or without motive power used or designed to be used for 
human habitation." In the same ordinance a trailer camp 
is defined as "Any area or tract of land used or desig-
nated to accommodate two or more automobile trailers 
or camping parties." (Section 8-1-5, subsections (67) and 
(68) ). There can be no question that the subsequent 1961 
"Mobile Home Park Ordinance"' a1nended these provi-
sions with respect to trailer camps. 
There can also be no doubt but that the general1957 
Zoning Ordinances which permitted trailer camps in 
Agricultural Zone A-2 must, of necessity, after the 1961 
a1nendments, permit mobile horne parks in Agricultural 
Zone A-2. 
The 1961 ordinance controlling the construction and 
use of mobile home parks, provides in Section 5-4-9 that 
"the minimum area for any mobile home park shall be 
five acres". Section 5-4-10 provides that each park shall 
provide 
"mobile horne spaces and each such space shall 
be clearly defined or delineated. Each space shall 
have an area of not less than 3,000 square feet, 
exclusive of streets and sidewalks, and a width of 
not less than 40 feet". 
The latest ordinance of Salt Lake County with respect 
to spacing and size therefore specifically provides that 
each 1nobile home must have not less than 3,000 square 
feet. -One cannot read the 1961 mobile home park ordi-
nances without realizing that Salt Lake County has 
provided here for attractiYe, beautiful, well-planned, co-
ordinated and engineered parks with modern sanitary 
s<>wag-<', lighting, and heating facilities to be available for 
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parh mohilP homP. This Court should not be misled into 
lwliPvin~ that tlw Inobile honw parks under discussion 
woulrl lw "~heepherder camps or cattle camps". 
ThPre is nothing inconsistent with the fact that Salt 
Lake County provided lots for residences in Agricultural 
Zone A-:2 ~hould be of not less than one acre in size for 
homes and at the smne time by independent ordinances 
al~o provided that mobile home parks should be no 
smallPr than five acres for each park with not less than 
:~,000 ~quare feet for each mobile home. It is further 
provided that where any boundary of a mobile home park 
abuts on a residential home or on property zoned for 
residential construction that a "six foot high fence wall 
or hedge properly related to surrounding topography and 
the eharacter of the surrounding development shall be 
provided along such boundary." 
The detailed requirements for the construction of 
~ueh a mobile home park assure all property owners that 
when eompleted such a park will be a credit to the area 
in which it is constructed. At any rate, this is a legisla-
tin' matter which Salt Lake County has concluded by the 
adoption of the aforesaid ordinances. Appellants are in 
no position to challenge the wisdom of these provisions 
of the Salt Lake County Ordinances. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Hanson granted Respondent a summary 
judgment in the trial court, dismissing Plaintiff-Appel-
lants' eause of action. He gave as his reasons for this 
ruling that Appellants failed to exhaust their adminis-
tratiYf' re1nedies, that they slept on their rights and "are 
not in a position at this date to resort to the courts for 
the purpose of prohibiting Respondents' building pro-
g-ram". Other reasons were urged by Respondents as 
justification for their summary judgment. Although not 
cited by the trial court as reasons for deciding the case in 
favor of Respondents, estoppel and the illegality of the 
amending ordinance (for example, it was "spot zoning") 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were argued and briefed for that court. Each and every-
one of these reasons for justification of the lower court's 
ruling are properly present for consideration and adop-
tion by this Court. These issues were framed for trial 
below and obviously should this Court conclude that sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate at this stage, Respond-
ents 1nust be afforded an opportunity to fully try these 
framed issues. Under no circumstances should this court 
reverse the trial court without requiring that the disputed 
factual issues be fully tried. 
However, Respondent reasserts its position that 
there is ample undisputed evidence to sustain the sum-
mary judgn1ent in favor of Defendants. The summary 
judgn1ent issued below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & :MANGU:M 
By :MAX K. MANGUM 
206 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Cottonwood 11! ('adows Company 
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